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The Constitutional Case of the American Commercial Republic 
 
Gordon Lloyd 
Dockson Emeritus Professor of Public Policy, Pepperdine University 
Senior Fellow, Ashbrook Center 
      
Introduction 
 
What joins commerce or trade on the one side with the republic and the rule of 
law on the other side is the centrality of contracts and consent. People have been 
exchanging goods and services for centuries, but only when money replaces 
barter does money making, personal profit, and private property become 
defensible and commerce emerges as a way of life.  Similarly, while the word 
“republic” has been around for centuries, only when placed in contrast to 
monarchy does the meaning become clear. By the 17th century, republicanism 
was seen as the alternative to monarchy or absolute rule by one person for his or 
her own private interest.  
 
Plato observed that a commercial regime is a city fit for pigs in contrast to the 
best regime run by philosophers.  Aristotle proclaims that the management of 
the household (oikos-nomos) is an inferior activity to the governing of the polis 
and that making money off of money is an unnatural act, whereas farming with 
an eye to self-sufficiency is praiseworthy.  Working our way through Aquinas 
and beyond we can discuss such concepts as the just price, the just wage, as well 
as the deadly sins that emerge from devoting too much attention to the secular 
world.  Such a study would reveal an important point: at some point the case had 
to be made in favor of a commercial republic. 
 
The John Locke and Adam Smith Foundations 
 
We begin our coverage with the late 17th century work of John Locke.  Locke’s 
dominant theme is that improvement in the material condition of mankind is 
both possible and desirable.  With the help of modern science, Locke presented a 
view of human progress and the transformation of nature that was unknown to 
the ancients.   
 
He argued that this improvement could best be achieved by challenging the 
existing economic system of mercantilism and feudalism along with the notion 
that monarchs had that divine right to rule.  Locke envisioned the essential unit 
of analysis to be the autonomous individual located in a state of nature free from 
social restraints and governmental regulations.  For Locke, this fundamental 
natural position was one of abject poverty.  Nevertheless, since God gave the 
world to man to enjoy and improve rather than to suffer and starve, those who 
are rational and industrious in taking care of themselves by plowing the land and 
investing in the useful arts and sciences are to be held in the highest esteem. 
Through the privatization of this common property, the general well-being is 
advanced.  Accordingly, the acquisition of private property is natural rather than 
suspect as the ancients would claim or theft as Rousseau and Marx would assert. 
These are the roots of modern commerce. 
 
Locke seriously undermined not only primogeniture in the economic world but 
also the divine right of kings in the political world. Legitimate government comes 
into existence by the consent of autonomous individuals who willingly surrender 
the right to adjudicate disputes and relinquish the power necessary and proper 
to make laws for the well-being of the community. Locke includes no idea that 
the rights of the people come from the government; rather, he sees the powers of 
the government as a conditional grant by the people. All the better, then, to 
separate the powers of government and limit the reach of government to 
specified objects. The people retain control over the vast areas of their life. And 
thus the modern republic is born. 
 
Adam Smith also focused on improving the human condition by increasing the 
wealth of the nation. Poverty was to be solved by increasing production, which in 
turn depended on the productivity of labor, which was strongly influenced by the 
division or specialization of labor that depended, finally, on the extent of the 
market.  Smith assumes that competition produces a fair outcome. But, according 
to Smith, human beings not only have a Lockean natural inclination to self 
preservation; the butcher, the baker, and the brewer also have a natural 
inclination to “truck, barter, and exchange” beef, bread, and beer with other 
human beings.  No “human wisdom” or governmental panning was needed to 
create this situation.  In seeking the cooperation of others, we do not appeal to 
their generosity, “but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own 
necessities but of their advantages.  Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend 
chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens.”   
 
Locke and Smith wrote that the practical arts and sciences actually lead to the 
improvement of society and that there is a natural progress from a primitive 
agricultural community to a “civilized and thriving country.” In such a society, 
the government is not extensively involved in the day-to-day operations of 
production and the granting of special privileges to a few companies. This 
defense of an active market rather than an active government was called the 
system of laissez faire by John Stuart Mill in 1848 and the system of free 
enterprise by von Hayek in the 20th century.  The presumption through the 
centuries is that individuals know what is best for themselves and that the 
market system works favorably.  The defense through the centuries is that a 
concern with self-interest is not the same as personal greed or self-indulgence.  A 
commercial society requires its habitants to learn the values of hard work, thrift, 
and moderation. On the other hand, there is a strong presumption from the 
Mercantilists through the Progressives that selfless administrators can be 
educated in how to determine the level and kind of production necessary for an 
efficiently run economy. 
 
The Federalist and Our Commercial Republic 
 
The authors of The Federalist Papers adapted Locke’s defense of private 
property and Smith’s model of the extended market to their vision of a 
commercial republic. The Federalists argued that the well-being of the nation 
depended on the presence of economic, political, and religious liberty.  These 
liberties, in turn, required the encouragement of a variety of opinions, passions, 
and interests, and these, in turn, depended on the encouragement of a 
commercial society across an extended territory. At the heart of Madison’s 
defense of commerce are the benefits that come from genuine competition. It is 
through the competition of firms and industries for the consumer that economic 
liberty is secured.  Similarly, the competition of the separate branches of 
government and different levels of a government, augmented by frequent and 
fair elections helps secure political freedom or “republican liberty.”  And linked 
to this is the notion that religious liberty is secured by the competition between a 
vast number and variety of religious sects.  Competition, of course, is encouraged 
by the extent of the market. 
 
The “oracle” Montesquieu, however, had argued that republics could only thrive 
in small and homogeneous communities where people knew each other and 
cared directly for the public things. To be sure, Montesquieu had supported 
federalism and the separation of powers, but he saw these republican 
institutions as auxiliaries to the success of a small and homogeneous society.  
The Federalist “corrected” Montesquieu by arguing that republican institutions 
will only be helpful over an extended territory with a variety of competing 
interests.  
 
Madison put it this way in Federalist 51:  “If all men were angels, no government 
would be necessary.”  Yet there is no temptation in Madison to transform men 
into angels or to eliminate the causes of faction.  The rule of law is better than the 
rule of man. That is the key to the modern case for republicanism and thus 
involves commerce as a solution. One might add that the rule of markets –the 
rule of law of demand and supply—is better than the rule of men in the economic 
realm. Modern republicanism does not stress the pre-existence of a common 
good. Nor is it willing to rely simply on the voice of the people as the expression 
of a common good. Our commercial republicanism appeals to a Constitution.  
 
Federalist 51 provides the institutional or constitutional framework for the 
operation of Federalist 10. The Federalists reject three previous modes of 
politics: absolute monarchy, direct democracy, and small scaled republicanism. 
Instead they defend the deliberate sense of the community.  That is what 
Madison means by the rule of law rather than the rule of men. The latter was 
seen as the very essence of tyranny.  
 
For the Progressives, however, this institutional framework was a mere façade 
for the rule of the upper over the lower class. The objective was to win the battle 
for democracy. Interestingly, one might have expected that Jefferson would have 
loomed large in the heroic figures of the Progressives. Yet, while Jefferson might 
have been a democrat, Progressives saw his understanding of democracy as 
underdeveloped. Namely, he put his emphasis on individual freedom and not 
social justice.  Instead the Progressives looked to Hamilton, seeking to cure his 
views of an attachment to the upper class while retaining his loose interpretation 
of national powers.   
 
Federalist 10 argues that the most common and durable source of faction is the 
property question. And that is what makes a conversation between the Founding 
and the Progressives possible. For Locke and Smith, private property is a 
legitimate reward for personal effort. It also leads to the improvement of the 
human condition. For Rousseau and Marx, private property is theft and the 
symbol of human alienation. Linked to the property question is what is the 
proper role of government? For Marx, all politics and government are about 
power and power ultimately is economic power, which, in turn, is about the few 
who own and the many who don’t own property.   
 
How Does the Constitution Ordain and Establish Our Commercial Republic? 
 
According to the Framers, a republican form of government is one where a) a 
scheme of representation takes place in contrast to both a monarchy and a 
(pure) democracy; b) there is a separation of powers between the legislative and 
executive branches; c) the judicial branch is independent of the political 
branches; and d) the legislative branch is be bicameral rather than unicameral.  
There is also e) a provision for frequent elections by the people with room for 
debate about the mode of election, the length of term of office, should the terms 
be staggered, and who can vote and who can run for office.  
 
Article One, Section Six indicates that, “Senators and Representatives shall 
receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out 
of the Treasury of the United States.” This underscores the commercial nature of 
the republic. The idea of paying someone to serve the public was certainly 
untraditional. But that is what the Framers proposed. Now that did not mean 
that the electorate and the elected were to be motivated simply by money; rather 
it meant that it is appropriate to pay someone for services rendered, and we can 
always refuse to hire them again.  Besides, paying an elected official for their 
service certainly broadens the pool of who can be elected. 
 
We pay the elected representatives of the three branches of government while 
providing safeguards against the corruption that goes along with money. (See 
Article II, Section 1; Article III, Section 1; and Amendment XXVII.)  Article 1, 
Section 7 states that “all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of 
Representatives.” And there are specific restrictions on Congress and the States 
with respect to granting “titles of nobility.” There is no provision for 
primogeniture in the distribution of property and the divine right of kings in 
politics is replaced by the consent of the governed. We are a commercial 
republic. 
 
Among the 18 clauses in Article One, Section 8 outlining the powers of Congress, 
the first eight and the 18th deal directly with a commercial society.  The 
remaining powers focus on the common defense. Even here, the mores of a 
commercial society enter through the back door:  no appropriation to raise and 
support armies “shall be for a longer term than two years.”   
 
There was close to unanimous agreement at the Constitutional Convention that 
Congressional action under the Articles of Confederation was impeded by the 
unavailability of a regular source of funding and borrowing.  Thus the delegates 
agreed to grant the power to tax and borrow to Congress under the new 
Constitution (see Article I, Section 8, clauses 1 and 2).  
 
But what if Congress abuses this power? One answer is that the power is limited 
to support public policy that supports the general welfare and common defense.  
But what if these two clauses are used as invitations to expand the role of 
government rather than to limit the role of government? What policy can’t be 
justified in the name of the general welfare or common defense? The Framers’ 
answer is that ultimately the people themselves - initially through regular 
elections and ultimately through the amendment process - must express their 
“deliberate sense” on the issue. Whether one interprets these clauses loosely or 
strictly has had a huge impact on the kind of commercial society and republican 
government that has unfolded in the United States. For example, the New Deal 
and Great Society programs in the 20th century and Obamacare in the 21st 
century owe much to a broad constitutional interpretation of these clauses. 
 
The most famous is Article 1, Section 8, clause three - known popularly as the 
interstate commerce clause. The clause granting Congress the power to “regulate 
commerce…among the several states” is vital to the creation and preservation of 
an interstate commercial republic over an extended territory.  But what exactly 
does this clause mean and has its meaning changed over time?  Is it possible to 
draw a clear line between intrastate and interstate commerce as the Supreme 
Court in the New Deal era attempted to do?  What exactly constitutes commerce?  
Does Chief Justice John Marshall’s decision in McCulloch v Maryland settle the 
issue for good?  Again, the New Deal, the Great Society, and Obamacare programs 
relied on a very expansive rather than restrictive interpretation of the meaning 
of this clause.   
 
Six of the eight restraints on Congress in Article 1, Section 9, and six of the 
sixteen restraints on the state governments in Article 1, Section 10 are directly 
or indirectly related to a commercial republic operating within a federal 
framework. For example, Congress is forbidden from laying “a tax or duty…on 
articles exported from any state,” and Congress shall give no preference “by any 
regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over those of 
another.” And the states are forbidden from coining money, emitting “bills of 
credit,” or “impairing the obligation of contracts.”  
 
 
Constitutional Amendments and the Progressive Challenge 
 
There are 27 amendments to the Constitution, 20 of which are the result of 
decisions made during the three main “eras” in American public policy:  ten from 
the founding, three from the civil war era, and seven from the Progressive-New 
Deal era of the 20th century.   Half of the founding amendments, 1/3 of the civil 
war amendments, and 4 out of 7 from the 20th century deal directly or indirectly 
with a commercial republic.   
 
The important question is this: Do these 10 out of 27 Amendments reinforce the 
original design of a commercial republic or fundamentally change the 
commercial nature of the republic? 
 
The most important founding-era amendment is the 5th Amendment, which 
states that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, and property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public us, without just 
compensation.” There are al sorts of questions that have emerged. What is 
private property?  Do the rules of due process change over time?  Who 
determines “just compensation?” And what burden of proof must the 
government meet to warrant the takings of private property “for public use.”  Do 
the different claims of private property and public use actually put commerce 
and republicanism on a potential collision course?  The important point is that 
this Amendment reinforces the attachment of the republic to a commercial 
society where a strong argument has to be made to take away private property 
and that such seizure must be done according to the rule of law.   
 
One of the most controversial aspects of a commercial republic is the possibility 
that there may be no limits on what people can own and then trade.  For 
example, is it consistent with the principles of a commercial republic that people 
can own other people and then buy and sell them on the open market?  A strong 
argument can be made that free labor and slave labor are inconsistent with each 
other and one or the other mode must ultimately prevail; a commercial society 
and a feudal/slave society cannot subsist together.  Suffice it to note that the 13th 
Amendment removes the tension by eliminating slavery from the United States. 
 
The 44 words in Section One of the 18th Amendment are intended to introduce a 
remarkable change in our commercial republic. In popular terminology, this 
section prohibited and criminalized the purchase and consumption of alcoholic 
beverages. But there is a bit more nuance and ambiguity to this section.  
 
We can collect the 44 words into five separate but related categories. 1) After 
one year from the ratification of this article 2) the manufacture, sale, or 
transportation of intoxicating liquors 3) within, the importation thereof into, or 
the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof 4) for beverage purposes 5) is hereby prohibited.   
 
Americans, for most of their history, accepted that the Constitution limited the 
reach of the federal government to few and defined objects leaving the rest of 
public policy to state and local governments or to the private commercial sector.  
An important feature in Section One of the 18th Amendment, therefore, is that it 
introduces the proposition that we as individual Americans are not free to 
engage in the commerce and the consumption etc., of certain beverages.  Not 
having a drink is made the moral equivalent of not owning a person.  And it is 
done in the name of republican and public virtue over against commercial and 
personal vice. And all done constitutionally.  A politically decentralized and 
commercial nation overwhelmingly accepted the argument that drinking was a 
moral issue beyond the scope of the market and vital for the well-being of the 
republic.   
 
But what was not anticipated was the endurance of entrepreneurial politics in 
American life.  Section One does not even mention the words, “purchase,” 
“consumption,” and “alcohol.”  What is there is the phrase “intoxicating liquors.”  
This leaves open to Congressional debate, the definition of “intoxicating liquors.”   
What about “sacramental wine,” and “medicinal alcohol?” Nor is anything said 
about prohibiting drinking when eating!  This ambiguous language is not 
accidental; it reflects the persistence of entrepreneurial politics in America. The 
21st Amendment that overturned the 18th Amendment confirmed that we are 
indeed a commercial (federal) republic. 
 
The Progressives in the late 19th and early 20th century relied on the clauses of 
Article I, Section 8 to regulate the relationship between capital and labor and to 
support the development of labor union activity. The Progressives also provided 
a significant challenge to the traditional understanding of the role of government 
in a commercial republic. They introduced three new cabinet departments that 
were directly responsible for regulating the three sectors of the economy:  the 
Agriculture Department, the Labor Department, and the Commerce Department.  
The roles of these departments have expanded over the last hundred years in an 
effort to control rather than to encourage the operation of a commercially based 
republic.  And they succeeded in securing the passage of the 16th Amendment, 
which gave Congress the power “to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and 
without regard to any census or enumeration.”  
 
With the Progressives, equality replaces liberty as the central concern of both 
economics and politics.  The role of the federal government is to regulate 
interstate commerce, thus the ICC and the emergence of the three new cabinet 
departments. 
 
So the Progressives are against both the improved science of politics AND the 
extended commercial republic. They would rather have a parliamentary system 
governed by a centralized administration and a society that holds to the values of 
social justice or communal freedom than individual liberty that seems to 
reinforce the selfish side of human nature. Competition implies market failure 
whereas government intervention suggests government solution. And there is no 
sense saying that local government is better, because according to the 
Progressives, these social problems do not recognize state boundaries. Thus, in 
addition to the separation of powers and checks and balances, the Progressives 
have no affinity for federalism.   
 
Coordination rather than competition leads to good outcomes and leadership is 
linked to the notion of knowledge. There is a Progressive inclination toward a 
body of knowledge that can be certified by an advanced degree somehow 
independent from special or personal interests. These public servants will seek 
the common good and since commerce and the common good do not go together, 
it is the job of government to reign in the self interested few who would shaft us 
unsuspecting and innocent many. 
 
